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Abstract
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program is the country’s largest source of federal subsidy
for affordable housing. Since its inception, the program has financed more than 2.2 million housing
units, accounting for about one-sixth of all rental housing in the country.1 Limited affordability periods,
and the ability for property owners to “opt out” of the program after 15 years, have raised concerns
about the loss of affordable units to market rate conversion, particularly in strong housing markets.
Organizations that provide permanently affordable housing, often referred to as “shared equity”
models, can ensure the affordability and stewardship of LIHTC housing in perpetuity and preserve
public subsidies. In turn, the LIHTC program can more effectively utilize public dollars by funding the
permanently affordable housing sector. Based on a review of Qualified Allocation Plans (QAPs) for all
fifty states and Washington DC, this report identifies policies and preferences states have adopted to
guide the allocation of LIHTC resources that can support permanently affordable housing.
Khadduri, Jill, Climaco, Carissa, Burnett, Kimberly, Gould, Laurie and Elving, Louise. 2012, August. What Happens to Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit Properties at Year 15 and Beyond? US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy and Development Research.
Retrieved August 7, 2012: http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/hsgfin/lihtc_report2012.html.
1

What is Permanently Affordable
Housing?
Permanently affordable housing (PAH) is housing that
is affordable to low- and moderate-income households
now and in the future. The PAH sector includes both
permanently affordable rental units and shared equity
homeownership units. Shared equity homeownership
models—including community land trusts (CLTs),
limited equity cooperatives and long-term deedrestricted housing programs—restrict the price
for which a home is sold to the first lower income
buyer and every subsequent lower income buyer
to preserve affordability in perpetuity. Ultimately,
these homeowners and the stewarding organization
agree to share the rights, responsibilities, risks, and
rewards of homeownership. In this report, non-profit
and government organizations with shared equity
homeownership programs are referred to as “PAH
organizations.”
PAH organizations are committed to providing
a continuum of housing options for low-income
households. They have an expertise in helping
households attain and retain homeownership and,
in the process, build the kind of transformational
wealth that changes lives. On the rental side, PAH
organizations have provided low-income households
with high-quality and affordable housing that allows
them to realize residential stability and financial
security. The PAH sector is able to achieve these
results by equally emphasizing resident support
services and quality housing design, construction, and
management. The stewardship of homes and residents
provided by PAH organizations ensures that: 1) highquality, well-maintained affordable housing benefits
communities, and 2) lower income households realize
positive outcomes from their tenure.

What is the Low Income Housing
Tax Credit?
Established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program
provides market incentives for the development
or rehabilitation of rental housing affordable to
households with incomes equal to or less than 60
percent of area median income (AMI). In its more than
25 year history, LIHTC has become the largest program
in the United States for affordable rental housing

production, having helped fund the development of
more than 2.2 million housing units.2
The federal government annually issues tax credits
to state housing finance agencies (HFAs) on a percapita basis. State HFAs allocate credits through a
competitive process in accordance with their housing
priorities articulated by their Qualified Allocation Plans
(QAP), the principle document used to determine
which housing developments receive tax credits
during a given allocation period.3 Developers sell tax
credits to investors in exchange for equity; investors
in turn get ten years of tax credits based on the
total development cost.4 The developer, or general
partner, is responsible for managing the project,
while the credit purchaser typically assumes a passive
investment role.
Properties financed with tax credits must remain
affordable to low-income households for 15 years
from the date they are placed in service (Figure 1).
Projects that fall out of compliance with low-income
occupancy requirements are subject to tax credit
recapture. Despite changes to the LIHTC program in
1989 that extended the affordability period from 15
to 30 years, year 15 remains a critical juncture in the
life of LIHTC projects. After the initial 15-year period,
the obligation to report to the IRS on compliance
issues ends. Hence, investors are no longer at risk
of IRS penalties for failure to comply with program
rules, and the HFA assumes sole responsibility for
compliance monitoring.5 Additionally, an owner of a
LIHTC property with a 30-year affordability restriction
can opt out of the program in year 15 through the
Qualified Contract (QC) process by requesting the HFA
find a buyer committed to maintaining the property
under the affordability restrictions.6 If no purchaser is
found, affordability restrictions are phased out and the
owner can reposition the units at market-rate.
Ibid.
There are two types of LIHTCs—9% and 4% credits. Only the 9% credits,
which generate more equity, are awarded on a competitive basis through
the QAP. Four percent “as of right credits” are non-competitive and used in
conjunction with bond financing.
4
The total amount of development cost eligible for generating LIHTC is
the “eligible basis.” Eligible costs include all “hard” construction costs and
most depreciable “soft” costs. Land and building acquisition costs are not
included in the eligible basis. For more information on the eligible basis and
calculating tax credits see Enterprise Community Partners Introduction to
LIHTC available at: http://www.enterprisecommunity.com/search-results?oSearch=eligible+basis.
5
Ibid.
6
Transferring property to another owner will require additional costs. A
nonprofit buyer will either have to secure additional grant funding or take
on more debt, which can force up rents, reducing affordability and put the
property at risk of default if the new debt is significant.
2
3
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Figure 1: LIHTC Timeline
Placed in Service,
Year 1

Year 10

Year 15

Year 30

Tax Credit Use Period

Initial Affordability Period
Compliance and Recapture Period; Monitoring by IRS and HFA

Extended Affordability Period
Monitoring and Enforcement by State HFA Only

Owner can opt out
through Qualified
Contract Process

Using LIHTC resources on permanently affordable
housing projects would increase the number of lower
income households across generations served by the
LIHTC program and concurrently retain the public’s
investment in affordable housing. Through LIHTC
rental housing, the PAH sector can meet the needs of
low-income households. At year 15, the PAH stewards
would assess community needs and determine if
LIHTC units should remain as permanently affordable
rentals or be converted to permanently affordable
owner-occupied housing using one of the shared
equity homeownership models.
The LIHTC program can provide an important and
substantial source of funding for the PAH sector,
particularly since financing affordable housing has
become more challenging during the economic
recession. While some PAH organizations have
effectively used LIHTC to increase the supply of
permanently affordable housing in their communities,7
LIHTC deals are extremely complex. Smaller
organizations often lack the capacity and technical
expertise to put together project financing, undertake
compliance reporting, and manage rental properties.
Organizations without tax credit or rental management
experience may build capacity through collaboration
with an experienced tax credit project developer.

CLTs that have completed LIHTC projects include the Athens Land Trust,
California Community Foundation Land Trust, Champlain Housing Trust,
Irvine CLT, Mountainlands Community Housing Trust, NeighborWorks Blackstone River Valley, Sawmill Land Trust, Tenants to Homeowners, Inc., Thistle
Communities, and Women’s Community Revitalization Project.
7

Directing Tax Credit Allocations
through the QAP
The Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) is a policy tool that
establishes the state’s housing priorities and specifies
the criteria used to select tax credit projects. State
agencies “score” competing projects, awarding points
to projects with characteristics outlined in the QAP.8
Because the supply of credits is limited, the allocation
process is highly competitive under normal market
conditions, and the QAP exerts strong influence on the
character of LIHTC housing produced.
States typically use three mechanisms to guide the
allocation of tax credits—threshold requirements, setasides and point-based scoring criteria.
•

Threshold requirements set minimum standards
for LIHTC projects. Only developments meeting
the threshold requirements are eligible to receive
credits.

•

Set-asides are funds from a state’s tax credit
allocation pool dedicated to specific types of
projects.

•

Point-based scoring criteria are used to rank
qualifying development proposals based on state
affordable housing priorities. HFAs award extra
points to projects with desired characteristics.

Gustafson, Jeremy and Walker, Christopher. 2002, May. Analysis of State
Qualified Allocation Plans for the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program.
US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy and
Development Research. Retrieved March 5, 2012: http://www.huduser.
org/portal/publications/hsgfin/analysis_of_sqa_plans.html.
8
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The QAP is a state-wide document and must
incorporate elements that encourage developers to
meet the diverse housing needs of rural, suburban
and urban areas. In this way, HFAs often include a
number of requirements and selection criteria in their
QAPs that may contradict or work against others. For
instance, a QAP may award points to large multifamily
projects consisting of at least 50 units and to projects
that intend to convert to tenant ownership. However,
homeownership conversions may only be permissible
in developments consisting of single-family homes,
duplexes and townhomes. In these cases, HFAs must
balance competing criteria and developers must
carefully consider their application as a whole in order
to decide which points they want to pursue in order to
be competitive.
Drawing on an analysis of the QAPs for all fifty states
and Washington DC,9 this report identifies policies
and preferences states have adopted to guide the
allocation of LIHTC resources that may support PAH.
Although no HFAs currently use LIHTC set-asides or
points for PAH tax credit applicants, we focus on two
categories of preferences that can favor the PAH
sector: extended affordability periods and conversion
to tenant ownership.

Incentivizing PAH through Extended
Affordability
Extended periods of affordability required or
incentivized by HFAs in their QAPs align well with the
PAH sector’s provision of affordability in perpetuity.
Many states provide incentives or require developers

to commit to a 30-year extended affordability period,
and a smaller number of states encourage or require
developers to ensure affordability for more than 30
years. Because of their missions and track records,
PAH organizations are uniquely positioned to increase
the competitiveness of their LIHTC application by
committing to extended affordability periods.
Thirteen states require LIHTC applications to extend
affordability beyond the 15-year compliance period
to be eligible to receive tax credits (Table 1). Almost
twice as many states (24) incentivize extended
affordability periods through the allocation of points.
Nine states both require affordability restrictions
beyond the 15-year compliance period and reward
applications that go beyond the threshold requirement
with points. Five states do none of the above. In
these states, developers are still expected to satisfy
the federal extended affordability period but the
QAPs do not reinforce or strengthen this program
requirement.
Of the 13 states that require extended affordability
periods as part of their threshold requirements,
9 mandate that LIHTC applications commit to
maintaining affordability for a minimum of 30 years
(Table 2). The remaining 4 states require applications
to exceed the federal minimum. While no state
specifically requires extended affordability through
PAH models, New Hampshire and Utah mandate LIHTC
project affordability in perpetuity. New Hampshire
allows for an opt-out in year 30 but the complex and
onerous exit process discourages property owners
from leaving the program.

Table 1: How States Incentivize Extended Affordability
Mechanism

# of States

% of States

States

Total

51

100%

Threshhold Requirements

13

25%

CA, ME, MD, MN, NH, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, UT, VT, WI

Points

24

47%

AL, AK, AR, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, LA,
MT, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OK, TN, TX, WV, WY

Threshold and Points

9

18%

KS, MA, MI, MS, NV, ND, SC, SD, WA

None

5

10%

AZ, IN, KY, MO, VA

We analyzed the most recent version of each QAP available. Depending
on the state and their application timeline, the versions dated from 2011
to 2013.
9
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Table 2: Length of Extended Affordability Thresholds by State
# of States

% of States

States

Threshhold Requirements

13

26%

CA, ME, MD, MN, NH, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, UT, VT, WI

30 years

9

18%

ME, MN, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, VT, WI

31-40 years

1

2%

MD

41-62 years

1

2%

CA

99+ years

2

4%

NH, UT

Table 3: Length of Extended Affordability Periods for States that use Thresholds and Points
# of States

% of States

States

Threshhold and Points

9

18%

KS, MA, MI, MS, NV, ND, SC, SD, WA

30 years

2

4%

KS, ND**

31-40 years

2

4%

SC, WA

41-62 years

4

8%

MI, MS, NV, SD

99+ years

1

2%

MA

**KS and ND offer points to incentivize that projects meet the 30-year threshold period.

Several states use a combination of threshold
requirements and point incentives to encourage longterm affordability (Table 3). All of these states require
that LIHTC applications meet a minimum threshold
of 30 years of affordability and then provide points
to incentivize an even longer-term commitment.
Massachusetts, for example, requires that developers
ensure affordability for 30 years and their QAP awards
3 points (or 1.6% of the total point allocation) for 50
additional years of affordability and 6 points (or 3.3%
of the total points) for a guarantee of affordability in
perpetuity.
The most popular way that HFAs extend project
affordability beyond the 15-year compliance period
is to exclusively offer point incentives with nearly
half of states (47%) using this mechanism (Table 4).
Four states offer points to applications that extend
affordability for less than the federal minimum
standard. While not ideal, this acknowledges that
developers likely need incentives to meet program
guidelines and not opt-out in year 15. Fifteen of
the 24 states (29%) encourage longer affordability
restrictions with the vast majority (11 states)
incentivizing affordability for more than 40 years.

Point incentives vary by the length of affordability
restrictions they encourage and by the weight they
carry in the overall QAP application score (Table 5). Of
the 33 states that offer point incentives (alone or in
conjunction with threshold requirements) almost half
(16) allocate only a small percentage of total points to
projects that extend affordability periods. Given the
extremely competitive nature of tax credit allocations,
however, even small point incentives can make a
difference.
As the PAH sector ensures affordability in perpetuity,
these points offer a natural opportunity to increase
application competitiveness. As described above, PAH
organizations may increase their capacity and LIHTC
competitiveness by partnering with an experienced
tax credit project developer. Such a partnership,
however, should be advantageous to both groups.
A PAH organization’s ability to satisfy extended
affordability requirements or incentives makes them
an attractive partner in a LIHTC project. Because PAH
organizations produce high-quality housing that is built
to last, however, they may be penalized for higher
per unit construction costs. State HFAs should find
ways to formally value high quality construction and
permanent affordability as long-term investments that
justify higher construction costs.
5

Table 4: Length of Extended Affordability Periods for States that use Only Points
# of States

% of States

States

Total

24

47%

AL, AK, AR, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, LA, MT,
NE, NJ, NM, NY, OK, TN, TX, WV, WY

Less than 30 years

4

8%

AL, AR, GA, TN

30 years

5

10%

AK, DE, IA, NY, WV

31-40 years

4

8%

CO, LA, OK, TX

41-62 years

11

21%

CT, DC, HI, ID, IL, MT, NE, NJ, NM, WY, FL

Table 5: Strength of Point Incentives for Extended Affordability
Strength of Point Incentive
Total
Strong
(> 10% of total points)
Moderate
(5%-10% of total points)
Weak
(< 5% of total points)

# of States

% of States

States

33

100%

AL, AK, AR, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, KS,
LA, MA, MI, MS, MT, ND, NE, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OK,
SC, SD, TN, TX, WA, WV, WY

7

21%

CO, HI, ID, NJ, NY, WA, WV

10

30%

FL, IA, MT, NM, ND, OK, SC, SD, TN, WY

16

49%

AL, AK, AR, CT, DC, DE, GA, IL, KS, LA, MA, MI, MS,
NE, NV, TX

Conversion of LIHTC Rentals to
Shared Equity Homeownership
Though generally thought of as a rental program,
LIHTC rules allow for the conversion of rental units to
tenant ownership, enabling states to use tax credits
as a tool to promote homeownership. Although no
HFAs expressly encourage conversion to shared equity
homeownership, HFAs could promote the expansion
of this homeownership model to ensure long-term
affordability and retention of public funding.
To encourage shared equity homeownership, LIHTC
projects can be structured up-front as lease-purchase
programs, whereby tenants may purchase their
units with resale restrictions in year 15.10 While
some housing advocates consider the 15-year leasepurchase tenancy period too long for most potential
homebuyers, the Cleveland Housing Network (CHN),
which operates one of the largest and most successful
lease-purchase programs financed with LIHTC, has
maintained a strong renter-to-owner conversion rate.11
LIHTC units sold to tenants are released from the additional 15-year
extended use period.
11
Immergluck, Dan and Schaeffing, Philip. 2010, October 12. Responsible
Lease-Purchase: A Review of the Practice and Research Literature on Non10

Alternatively, an organization can structure their
LIHTC properties as conventional rentals, offering
all or a portion for lease-purchase or shared equity
homeownership in year 15. This approach provides
the flexibility to develop a housing strategy that meets
the changing needs of existing residents and the
broader community.12 Given that most LIHTC projects
are multifamily developments, which may not lend
themselves to homeownership, it can be difficult to
convert LIHTC units that were not originally intended
for lease-purchase. Additionally, some states restrict
LIHTC conversions, only allowing scattered site singlefamily, duplex or townhome units to be transferred to
homeownership.
While lease-purchase programs offer a creative way
to use the LIHTC program to support shared equity
homeownership, these programs are complex to
develop and administer.13 Structuring and managing
the financing within the LIHTC program is difficult,
profit Programs. Retrieved October 2, 2012: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691194.
12
NeighborWorks America, 2012, June. Scattered Site Rental Toolkit: Business Planning for Development & Management. Retrieved August 2, 2012:
http://www.stablecommunities.org/ssr/0/SSR_Index.htm.
13
See NeighborWorks (2012) and Immergluck and Schaeffing (2010) for
more on the advantages and challenges of lease purchase programs.
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requiring capacity that non-profits may not have.
However, shared equity homeownership programs
do have the stewardship capacity to provide resident
education, counseling, and ongoing support, which are
crucial for the success of lease-purchase programs.
Most states (44) incentivize LIHTC projects that
provide homeownership opportunities to tenants after
the 15-year compliance period (Table 6). Eight states
explicitly offer conversion to homeownership as an
alternative to the 15-year extended use agreement.
In these states, developers can either opt to abide
by affordability restrictions for a full 30 years or offer
homeownership opportunities to existing residents in
year 15 in order to meet threshold requirements.
Only one state, Utah, sets aside funds specifically for
projects that encourage eventual homeownership.
Utah allocates five percent of tax credits to projects
sponsored by government and non-profit developers

that offer homeownership opportunities to tenants
after the 15-year compliance period. While four
states favor projects that encourage eventual
homeownership when application scores result in a
tie, most states (67%) incentivize conversion to tenant
ownership through points.
Sixty-eight percent of states that incentivize eventual
tenant ownership through points offer less than 5%
of the total point allocation for this purpose (Table
7). Twenty nine percent offer between 5 and 10% of
the points, and Colorado is the only state that deeply
incentivizes tenant ownership by allocating
more than a quarter (26%) of its total point allocation
to applicants who promise to offer homeownership
opportunities in year 15.
QAPs provide various levels of detail to explain what
a transition to tenant ownership entails. Several
states, including Florida and Tennessee, require

Table 6: How States Incentivize Transitions to Tenant Ownership
Incentive Mechanism

# of States

% of States

States

Total

44

86%

AL, AK, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID,
IL, IN, LA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, MT, NC,
ND, NE, NJ, NV, OH, OK, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT,
VT, WA, WI, WV

Threshold Requirements

8

16%

CA, KS, MD, MS, OH, PA, RI, SD

Set-Asides

1

2%

Points

34

67%

UT
AK, AR, AZ, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IN, KS, LA,
ME, MI, MN, MS, MT, NE, ND, NJ, NM, NY, OK, SC,
SD, TN, TX, UT, WA, WV, WI

Tie Breakers

4

8%

AL, IL, NC, VT

None

7

14

MA, NH, NM, NY, OR, VA, WY

Table 7: Strength of Point Incentives for Transitions to Tenant Ownership
Strength of Point Incentive
Total
Strong
(> 10% of total points)
Moderate
(5%-10% of total points)
Weak
(< 5% of total points)

# of States

% of States

States

34

100%

1

3%

CO

10

29%

DC, FL, IA, LA, MS, MT, NJ, ND, OK, SC

23

68%

AK, AZ, AR, CT, DE, GA, HI, ID, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN,
NE, NM, NY, SD, TN, TX, UT, WA, WV, WI

AK, AZ, AR, CT, CO, DC, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, UN,
KS, LA, ME, MI, MN, MS, MT, NE, ND, NJ, NM, NY
OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WA, WV, WI
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homeownership plans, homeownership counseling,
down payment savings accounts and/or details on
purchase prices. PAH organizations are uniquely
positioned to score well in this category given their
stewardship capacity and experience with providing
successful homeownership opportunities for lowincome households.14

•

recommend more detailed language around
lease-purchase programs that highlight and
reward the stewardship components that PAH
organizations already have in place;

•

encourage partnerships between tax credit project
developers and organizations committed to
permanent affordability and stewardship.

Conclusion
The existing requirements and incentives that
favor extended affordability and homeownership
opportunities in state QAPs suggest significant
potential for the PAH sector to utilize the LIHTC
program as a tool to increase the production of
permanently affordable rental and owner-occupied
housing while maximizing the public’s investment.
However, the decision to undertake a LIHTC project
requires careful consideration. Given the complexity
of LIHTC deals, and the expertise and capacity they
require, organizations without tax credit or rental
management experience should work with an
experienced development partner.
HFAs can enhance LIHTC investment in the PAH sector.
HFAs draft QAPs annually providing advocates with
an opportunity to influence priorities for the LIHTC
program. During the QAP review and comment
period, advocates can:
•

educate HFAs about the benefits of PAH both
in terms of supporting low-income households
and preserving limited government subsidies.
Organizations should emphasize that while PAH
units may cost more up front, they tend to cost
less per household over the long term;

•

recommend a set aside for non-profit
organizations committed to permanent
affordability and ongoing stewardship;

•

encourage HFAs to require “waiver of qualified
contract” language which prohibits developers
from opting out of the LIHTC program in year 15;

According to a survey of CLTs, more than half (55%) of respondents
reported serving households earning 80% or less of AMI (Thaden, Emily.
2012, January 11. Results of the 2011 Comprehensive CLT Survey. The
Housing Fund, Vanderbilt University in conjunction with the National Community Land Trust Network and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Retrieved
April 26, 2012: http://www.cltnetwork.org/Resources/2011-Comprehensive-CLT-Survey).
14

8

LIHTC Resources
Enterprise Community Investment’s guide to LIHTC:
http://www.enterprisecommunity.com/financing-anddevelopment/low-income-housing-tax-credits
HUD LIHTC Basics: http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/
affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc/basics
Novogradac Affordable Housing Resource Center,
LIHTC Resources:
http://www.novoco.com/low_income_housing/
resources/index.php
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